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In this paper, we discuss the so-called paradox of ageing, with respect to the members of the age group 
55-64 years of age. This generation is (currently) too young to retire, despite the length of their working 
lives – for some in excess of forty years – and high earnings, yet is too old to continue working, since 
employers prefer to hire younger, more flexible and less expensive workers. Furthermore, official 
statistics show that the longevity of this generation is higher than its predecessors, an evolution that 
would apparently call for a gradual increase in the retirement age. The argument put forward by its 
advocates is that by keeping people at work for some more years, additional contributions will be 
received while delaying pension expenditure, thus compensating for the longer longevity prospects. We 
argue that, from the point of view of the long-term financial sustainability of the Social Security system, it 
would be preferable to provide this generation with an option to anticipate the retirement age, while 
penalising their retirement pension until they reach the age of 65. Such an option would serve as an 
alternative to a scenario of long-term unemployment in which individuals are granted unemployment 
benefits, normally exceeding the amount of the “anticipated pension“, at the same time as they continue 
to accumulate pension rights with no contributions to the system. Faced with a situation in which 
rationing exists in the supply of individual life annuities by the insurance market, we discuss the creation 
of a financial reserve fund to support life-expectancy increases for all generations, funded by a 
supplementary contribution, which would be used to pay for the pensions in excess of those resulting 
from a constant lifespan at the age of retirement for all of the generations. 
Since the “ageing equation” has no single solution, our aim is to broaden the current debate on the long-
term financial sustainability of the Social Security systems towards a richer perspective, in which raising 
the age of retirement is not the only solution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the course of the next 20 years, the approximately 2.4 million Portuguese who 
currently constitute the age group 45 to 64 years will reach the age of retirement. They 
are known as the “greying panthers” generation (Björkman et al., 2001) because they 
enjoy long-term employment, they have received more and better education than their 
parents, they are much better off in terms of financial resources and real estate 
ownership and on retirement, they will have far greater life expectancy than the 
generations that preceded them.  
 
The paradox of ageing, with respect to the greying panthers, is that members of this 
generation are too young to retire, despite the length of their working lives – in excess 
of forty years – and high earnings, yet they are too old to continue working, since 
employers prefer to hire younger, more flexible and less expensive workers.  
 
Table 1 - Population Distribution by Age Groups 
Age Group  Census 1991 Census 2001 Var.% 
Total  9,962,790  10,282.086   
0-14  1,991,562 19.99% 1,645,134 16% -17.395% 
15-24  1,626,924 16.33% 1,469,310 14.29% -9.688% 
25-44  2,742,756 27.53% 3,053,780 29.70% 11.340% 
45-64  2,245,613 22.54% 2,433,770 23.67% 8.379% 
15-64  6,615,293 66.40% 6,955,831 67.65% 5.148% 
65 & +  1,355,936 13.61% 1,681,121 16.35% 23.982% 
75 &+/65 &+ 533,154 39.32% 696,320 41.42% 30.604% 
85 &+/65 & + 92,204 6.80% 150,460 8.95% 63.183% 
Source: Evolução demográfica no período intercensitário 1991-2001. Carrilho, M. (2002) 
 
The age group in question, which represents 23.67% of the population, will be 
substituted when it retires by the 25-44 years age group, which at present accounts for 
29.70% of the working population. The increase of 6.03% would appear to be a positive 
development. However, a problem arises when the next age group, 15-24 years, moves 
up the age scale since this group shows a decrease of 9.688% in the 10-year period. At 
the same time, we observe the upward trend of the age group 75 years and over.  
 
Life expectancy at the age of retirement is one of the most influential factors taken into 
account in the financing of incomes for the duration of the retirement period. The 
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Portuguese Social Security system was set up in the 1980s (Law 28/84, 14th August) on 
a pay-as-you-go basis and has remained as such to the present time. Eurostat data for the 
period 1980-2001 reveals that Portuguese male life expectancy at the age of 60 
increased from 16.3 years to 18.2 years (+11.7%), while for women it increased from 
20.6 years to 22.2 years (+7.8%) during this period. The significance of this evolution is 
that on average, every pensioner who retires today will be entitled to the equivalent of 
almost two additional pension payments per year compared to previous generations. 
 
This massive intake of new pensioners is bound to place great strains on the public 
social services, particularly in the areas of health care and social security. The scarcity 
of financial resources, social infrastructures and medical support raises two urgent 
issues: the necessity to find alternative means of covering social risks, including 
dependency; moreover, the obvious necessity to implement an investment strategy to 
build up the savings required in order to meet the future needs in the areas mentioned 
above. 
 
The question of demographic dependency assumes particular relevance when we 
consider that the natural replacement of the generations is being undermined by the low 
levels of fertility. 
 
Table 2 - Dependency Ratios – the Young (0-19 over 20-59) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2020 Growth Growth 
        60-2001 60-2020 
EU-15 60.2 63.8 57.7 46.6 41.4 41.7 38.1 -30.73% -36.71% 
Italy 59.9 60.9 58.2 44.5 35.2 35 34.03 -41.57% -43.19% 
France 63.2 67.9 58.3 52.2 47.5 47.1 44.9 -25.47% -28.96% 
Spain 67.7 70.9 68.4 54.8 37.7 36.4 36.1 -46.23% -46.68% 
UK 57 61.8 58.1 48.5 46.5 46.1 40.4 -19.12% -29.12% 
Portugal 73.7 76.6 70 56.1 41.5 40.8 41.9 -44.64% -43.15% 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 3 -Dependency Ratios - the Elderly (60 & + over 20-59) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2020 Growth Growth 
        60-2001 60-2020 
EU-15 29.4 34.8 34.2 36.3 39.2 38.9 51.2 32.31% 74.15% 
Italy 24.9 30.5 32 37.1 42.5 43.3 58.1 73.90% 133.33% 
France 32.8 36.9 32.5 35.8 38.3 38.2 50.6 16.46% 54.27% 
Spain 23.6 27.7 29.7 35.7 38.1 37.6 48.9 59.32% 107.20% 
UK 32 37.5 39.1 38.9 37.6 37.5 46.7 17.19% 45.94% 
Portugal 22.1 28 31 35.5 38.8 39 44.9 76.47% 103.17% 
Source: Eurostat 
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It can be observed in the second of the tables above that the proportion of Portuguese 
aged 60 and over increased by almost 76.5% between 1960 and 2001. Furthermore, it is 
estimated that by 2020, this age group will represent almost 45% of the Portuguese 
population, which nevertheless is a less negative scenario that what is forecast for the 
average of the EU-15. Within this disequilibrium, two factors are determinant: the 
fertility rate and life expectancy. However, the question can be posed as to whether 
there are any prospects for a measure of relief from the fertility rate. Let us consider the 
following table: 
Table 4 - Fertility Rate 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2020 Growth
        60-2020
EU-15 2.59 2.38 1.82 1.57 1.48 1.47  -1.12 
Italy 2.41 2.42 1.64 1.33 1.24 1.24 1.41 -1.17 
France 2.73 2.47 1.95 1.78 1.88 1.9 1.8 -0,83 
Spain 2.86 2.9 2.2 1.36 1.23 1.25 1.7 -1.61 
UK 2.72 2.43 1.9 1.83 1.64 1.63 1.74 -1.09 
Portugal 3.1 2.83 2.18 1.57 1.52 1.42 1.69 -1.68 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As can be observed, the rate of 1.42 in 2001 is not sufficient to replace the population 
and neither will it suffice in 2020, in spite of the projected recovery.    
To a certain extent, the decreasing numbers of workers can be compensated by the entry 
of newly-arriving immigrants into the labour force. This is already taking place in 
Portugal, as elsewhere across the European Union.  
 
2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGEING FOR SOCIETY 
 
The pressure on the finances of social security caused by the ageing of the generation 
born between 1945 and 1960 are undoubtedly going to be intense (Fougère and Mérette, 
1999). The dependency ratio of the elderly in Portugal will grow by approximately 
70.3% between 2001 and 2020. Under ceteris paribus conditions, this would imply an 
increase of the same order in the equilibrium rate of contribution, currently estimated at 
20% for the old age pension. Labour input costs would not accommodate such an 
increase without adversely affecting the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy in 
global markets.  
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In addition, the ageing index, measured by the relation between the dependency ratio of 
the elderly and the same ratio in respect of the young, is going to rise substantially, 
although at a lower ate than the EU-15 average, as can be observed in the following 
table:  
Table 5 - The Ageing Index 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2020 
EU-15 0.488 0.545 0.593 0.779 0.947 0.933 1.344 
Italy 0.416 0.501 0.550 0.834 1.207 1.237 1.707 
France 0.519 0.543 0.557 0.686 0.806 0.811 1.127 
Spain 0.349 0.391 0.434 0.651 1.011 1.033 1.355 
UK 0.561 0.607 0.673 0.802 0.809 0.813 1.156 
Portugal 0.300 0.366 0.443 0.633 0.935 0.956 1.072 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The problem may be alleviated in the short and medium term by means of immigration, 
which is already taking place, evident in the fact that almost 8% of the current 
Portuguese work force is of overseas origin. However, this is not a viable solution for 
the long term, owing to several explanatory reasons: 
 Portuguese society lacks the conditions necessary to absorb and integrate the 
number of immigrants that would be sufficient to make up for the indigenous 
short-fall;  
 It must be taken into account that the immigrant population equally grows older 
and acquires social security entitlements;  
 Long-term unemployment of the middle-aged is substantially – although not 
exclusively – linked to the evolution away from labour-intensive employment in 
favour of technology.    
 
In view of the situation outlined above, it would appear that the most appropriate and 
effective course of action would be to increase investment in advanced technologies and 
concomitant skills training, as well as to improve productivity throughout the economy. 
In order to finance these objectives, the savings of the “greying panthers” generation are 
crucial. The key question that this raises is whether its members are disposed to 
refraining from behaving in accordance with the life-cycle theory, which asserts that in 
a world with no uncertainty, rational individuals would save optimally and, on 
retirement, they would merely allocate their wealth by spreading assets over their 
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remaining years of life, so as to ensure optimal retirement consumption (and cover 
bequest motives, if any). Or, on the contrary, faced with the prospect of outliving their 
expected lifespans, will they plan their savings strategy in order to offset future 
reductions of their State retirement pensions resulting from the age-wave phenomenon, 
which can be compensated by private saving on an individual or collective basis?   
 
In a scenario of unknown longevity, retirees can reduce the risk of exhausting assets 
before passing away by consuming less per year, but such a tactic then increases the 
chance that they might die with too much wealth left unconsumed. In other words, 
dying with too little wealth is undesirable, but having too much wealth is also 
undesirable, since it represents foregone consumption opportunities. 
 
3. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
In the light of the demographic scenario described above, together with its implications 
for the financial sustainability of the Social Security system, it is of vital importance to 
examine some alternative solutions which, while contributing to the objective of 
balancing the public finances, do not place at risk the income of the future pensioners.  
Among the various possible options, we shall only consider here the raising of the age 
of retirement, working beyond the age of retirement and the creation of a Reserve Fund 
dedicated to meeting the costs associated with life-expectancy increases and developing 
annuity markets. 
 
3.1. RAISING THE AGE OF RETIREMENT 
 
Raising the age of retirement is one of the multiple options included in the so-called 
parametric reforms, a group of reforms in which long-term financial sustainability is 
pursued by changing the parameters of the system (Lewinsky, 2000; Adair, 2003). 
Other examples include increasing the employee/employer contribution rate, decreasing 
the rate of pension formation for each year of contributions and increasing the number 
of years considered in the calculation of the retirement pension. 
 
 5
The argument put forward by its advocates, including under-informed government 
ministers, is that by keeping people at work for some more years, contributions received 
by the State Social Security system will increase, while pension expenditure will be 
delayed. Unfortunately, this idea is too simplistic and would only be superficially 
effective, since the central issue is unemployment, above all among the 45-64 years age 
group. Evidence of this can be observed in the tables below. 
 
Table 6 - The Unemployed Population by Age Band - Annual Figures 
Age Group 1999 % 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 
15 – 24 61.6 27.3 58.,1 28.3 63.6 29.8 77.6 28.7 89.4 26.1 89.2 24.4 
25 – 34 64.5 28.6 55.5 27.0 56.6 26.5 79.9 29.5 109.4 32.0 106.6 29.2 
35 – 44 46.8 20.7 40.8 19.9 42.0 19.7 53.3 19.7 69.2 20.2 75.9 20.8 
45 – 54 35.9 15.9 32.0 15.6 31.3 14.7 36.6 13.5 42.3 12.4 57.2 15.7 
55 – 64 17.0 7.5 19.0 9.3 20.0 9.4 23.0 8.5 32.0 9.3 36.0 9.9 
Total 225.8 100 205.4 100 213.5 100 270.4 100 342.3 100 364.9 100 
Source: Eurostat, INE; Unit: 103 
 
The unemployment rate in relation to each respective age-group demonstrates that the 
oldest groups in the scale have experienced the greatest increase in unemployment. It 
thus follows that the unemployed in the oldest age-groups are the least likely to find 
new employment. 
 
Table 7 - Unemployment Rate by Age Band 
Age Group 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
15 - 24 8.743% 8.527% 9.363% 11.617% 14.461% 
25 - 34 4.828% 4.087% 4.099% 5.646% 7.550% 
35 - 44 3.739% 3.187% 3.219% 4.036% 5.113% 
45 - 54 3.572% 3.092% 2.936% 3.392% 3.840% 
55 - 64 2.991% 3.278% 3.462% 3.838% 5.240% 
 
The proportion of pensioners retiring directly from unemployment, as a percentage of 
the total of pensioners in early retirement, was higher than 40% in the period 2002-
2004, although the trend in fact was downward.  
 
It should be noted that granting authorisation for early retirement proves less costly for 
the system, in view of the penalties imposed for each year that the retirement is brought 
forward in advance of the legal age of retirement (65 years), than maintaining the 
individual in a marginal situation. 
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Table 8 - Early-Retired Pensioners 
  2002 2003 2004 
1. Total Pensioners in Early Retirement 62,457 71,121 84,608 
2. Pensioners Requesting Early Retirement 
With Unemployed Status 27,378 29,821 35,821 
(2) / (1) 44% 42% 42% 
Note: (2) / (1) - Percentage of pensioners in unemployment over the total of pensioners in 
early retirement. Source: Social Security statistics 
 
In the case of an individual taking retirement at 55 years of age after 30 years of 
contributing to the general Social Security system, the pension entitlement will 
correspond to no more than 35% of the last salary.  However, should the same 
individual remain in the labour market until the age of 65, the pension entitlement will 
rise to 81%. 
 
Table 9 - Illustration of the Loss Incurred on a Pension Claimed at Age 55 
 General Regime 
 Normal Pension Penalised Pension 
Date of Birth 01-01-1961 01-01-1961 
Date of Admission to S.S. 01-01-1987 01-01-1987 
Age on Retirement 65 55 
Age in 2005 44 44 
Inflation 2% 2% 
Salary Growth 3% 3% 
Monthly Salary in 2005 1,250 € 1,250 € 
Date of Retirement 31-12-2026 31-12-2016 
Nr. of Years Remaining until Retirement 21 12 
National Minimum Salary at the Time of 
Retirement 697.05 518.67 
Penalisation Factor - 0.55 
   
Pension 1,879 € 608 € 
 
The amount of loss to the pension in the example above is 67.6%, which is, by any 
account, remarkable. 
 
If circumstances determined that the individual was obliged to apply for unemployment 
benefit at the age of 55, with no possibility of taking early retirement, the additional cost 
to the State would amount to 11,824 euros over the course of the 3 years of 
unemployment which is the legally permitted maximum. 
 
 7
Table 10 - Illustration of the Loss Incurred by the State with Unemployment 




Salary at Age 55 1,730 
Monthly Unemployment Benefit 1,038 





Last Salary at Age 55 1,730 
Monthly Pension 608 
Total 3 years Pension Payments 25,550 
  
Differential to be Supported by the State 11,824 
 
From the above illustrations, we can conclude that the elimination of the option of early 
retirement at age 55 after 30 years of employment is a badly conceived measure, since it 
will have effects contrary to those intended. While it brings no positive effects to the 
public finances, the consequences for the renewal of the labour force equally may well 
prove to be negative, since jobs may continue to be held by workers until they are well 
into their old age. This, in turn, will bring negative effects on the productivity of 
enterprises, in addition to the obvious increase of the cost of unemployment among the 
age groups closest to retirement.   
 
If the problem was only perceived as concerning income, and if it was believed that 
enterprises were benefiting from a mechanism of corporate restructuring, resulting in 
savings for them and costs for the State, then it would have been preferable to maintain 
the payment of contributions destined for old-age pensions in the period between the 
age of early retirement and the legal retirement age.   
 
3.2. WORKING BEYOND THE AGE OF RETIREMENT 
 
Another possible measure would be to create the conditions in which people could be 
kept in employment beyond the age of retirement – either early or normal – in such 
areas as community support services, occupational training, managerial support to non-
profit organisations, etcetera. The remuneration would include the payment of the 
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respective social contribution into the Social Security system in Exchange for a revision 
of the value of the pension when the employee eventually retires. 
 
Table 11 - Population in Work Beyond the Retirement Age 
Age Group 1999 % 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 
55 - 64 568.4 11.05 579.6 11.08 577.7 10.85 599.2 11.08 610.7 11.18 
≥ 65 277.4 5.39 297.9 5.69 316.7 5.95 326.1 6.03 327.2 5.99 
Total 845.8 16.45 877.5 16.77 894.4 16.80 925.3 17.11 937.9 17.18 
Unit: thousands; Source: Eurostat 
 
As can be observed above, the proportion of individuals who remain in the labour 
market between the ages of 55 and 64 as a percentage of the total working population 
increased from 16.45% in 1999 to 17.18% in 2003. According to the European 
Commission study: “The Social Situation in the European Union in 2003: A Summary”, 
in 2001 the employment rate in Portugal among individuals in the age band 55 to 64 
years was 50.3%, a considerably higher figure than the EU-15 average, which was 
38.6%.  
 
It is worth pointing out that in addition, the above-mentioned study found that the 
average age at which retirement was taken in Portugal in 2001 was 62 years, whereas 
the EU-15 average age was 59.9 years. This data raises the suggestion that with regard 
to the issue of working beyond the age of retirement, Portugal is already an exemplary 
case.  
 
3.3. A FINANCIAL RESERVE FUND TO SUPPORT THE LIFE EXPECTANCY INCREASES 
 
As mentioned above, the Portuguese Social Security System is organised on a pay-as-
you-go basis. In order to maintain fairness in terms of the generations, the system must 
take into account a constant longevity for all of the generations. It would be from this 
basis that the equilibrium rate of contributions would be calculated. A supplementary 
contribution would have to be created to finance the costs of the life expectancy 
increases, since they correspond to additional pensions which have not been financed by 
the respective generations. This route has already been taken by various countries, most 
notably by Sweden, which has long been one of the best reference models of the 
Welfare State. It should be emphasised that a system of rationing exists in the supply of 
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individual life annuities that are available in the insurance market, the consequence of 
which is that the only way to provide them is by means of obligatory mutualisation in 
collective funds.  
 
However, the question is: which life expectancy is to be taken into consideration – that 
expressed at the inception of the system, or that of the most recent generation to have 
retired? We believe that it would be fair to take into account the life expectancy of the 
first generation to have completed a full working lifetime, that is to say, the youngest 
generation at the time of the system’s creation, whom, in relation to a career of forty 
years’ duration, is currently halfway through its full cycle of occupational activity.   
One question arises from the above point: What is the cost of this increase and how is it 
to be amortised? 
 
In order to be able to respond to the above question, we must accept that certain 
forecasts, namely, those that appear in the next table are likely to be accurate. 
 
Table 12 – Life Expectancy 
 1980 2020 2060 
Birth 71.5 78.8 83.7 
65 years 14.9 19.5 23.0 
Life Expectancy at 65 years 79.9 84.5 88.0 
 
The figures given in the column for 1980 appeared in data published by the INE, the 
Portuguese National Statistics Institute. The projections in relation to 2020 and 2060 
were obtained from data published in “World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision” 
by the Population Division of the United Nations Economics and Social Affairs in 
February 2003. According to this U.N. body, the projected life expectancy at birth for 
Portugal during the period 2020-2025 (combined for both sexes) will be 78.8 years. 
Furthermore, it is projected to reach 81 years in the period 2045-2050 (the latter 
projections do not appear in the table). 
 
In order to forecast life expectancy at 65 years, which we shall consider as the normal 
retirement age (NRA), we calibrated a mortality table produced in 1990 by the 
Department of Mathematics of the Faculty of Science and Technology, the 
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Universidade Nova de Lisboa, based on data from the INE, which was extrapolated for 
1994. The passage of time reveals that this table was a substantially accurate “snapshot” 
of the Portuguese population’s life trajectory. Thus, given the absence of any more up-
to-date instrument at our disposal, and based on the consideration that the trajectory will 
not alter significantly over the next 50 years, we calibrated the above-mentioned table in 
order to corroborate the figures projected in the United Nations study for the periods 
indicated.    
 
With regard to the most distant year projected, 2060, we took into account that the U.N. 
study proposes life expectancies in the interval [88.1; 83.7] for the 10 countries with the 
longest life expectancy at birth between 2045 and 2050. Therefore, let us suppose that 
Portugal would use the chronological distance of 10 years corresponding to the period 
2050-2060, which would place the country below the threshold of the group with the 
longest life expectancy.  
 
Thus, accepting these assumptions as reasonable, on observing the table above, it is 
quite possible to draw the following inferences for a person reaching the age of 65 
years:  
Table 13 – Life Expectancy 
 1980 2020 2060 
Birth-65 years (1) 6.5 13.8 18.7 
Diff. 65 years (2) 8.5 5.7 4.3 
Note. (1) Life expectancy beyond 65 years, defined at birth; (2) Difference between life 
expectancy beyond 65 years defined at birth and life expectancy defined at 65. 
 
These latter indicators merit some emphasis since, to a certain extent, they corroborate 
other studies; therefore, we can state, in simple terms, that “Diff. 65 years” decreases 
from 8.5 years in 1980 to 4.3 years in 2060, which is a reduction of approximately 50% 
in 80 years. This, combined with “Birth-65 years”, permits us to conclude that: 
 Not only will we live longer, but increasingly we will arrive at the NRA, a 
phenomenon known in the literature as the “expansion” of the curve of deaths. 
In other words, fewer of us will “fall by the wayside” before reaching the NRA. 
 
 Our “time” of death is increasingly concentrated around the mode (at adult and 
old ages) of the curve of deaths, a phenomenon well described by the 
 11
“rectangularisation” of the survival function. It is not inconceivable that 
advances in genetic science in the coming years will make possible the 
extension of human life until well beyond a century, to such an extent that the 
uncertainty of biological death becomes reduced to a couple of months at some 
time during this extended longevity.  
 
We are starting to observe a diminishing of the random element in the determination of 
the costs associated with Social Security systems, in addition to the determination of the 
amounts of the benefits to be paid out. Hence, given the existence of a demographic 
equilibrium between generations, the question, “What is the cost of living ever longer?” 
loses its meaning.  
 
If we consider as a benchmark a life expectancy at age 65 years of 19.5 years in 2020 
and 23 years in 2060, the implication is that any worker entering the system in 2020 and 
going on to complete 40 years of occupational activity will have to finance, throughout 
that period, the additional cost of having a life-expectancy “excess” of 3.5 years.  
 
Let us suppose that the annual pension at the NRA is given by , which could be the 
current Social Security General Regime pension. Thus, on reaching the NRA, the gain 
due to the life-expectancy “excess” can be measured by the difference: 
, where ,  are the actual amounts of an income for life 
determined in 2060 and 2020 (life annuities), respectively. 
rB
( )2 1r NRA NRAB a a− 2 NRAa 1 NRAa
 
The two most common methods to finance the above differential are: 
1. Pay the differential throughout the whole occupational lifetime; 
2. Accept a reduction in the income that will serve as the retirement pension.   
 
Once again, for the purpose of simplification, let us suppose that an individual enters 
the labour market at age 25 and completes a working life of 40 years, taking his/her 
retirement pension at age 65 (NRA) and who has, on average, a salary growth rate  
and that the technical interest rate (which, also in order to simplify, we can assume to 




A. Pay the differential throughout the whole occupational lifetime. 
 
Let us consider a beneficiary who starts his/her active life in 2020 at age 25 and expose 
him/her to two different scenarios. In order to pay the “life excess”, let us determine an 
instalment that is equal to a constant percentage of his/her salary. Thus, for each 1,000 € 
of annual income, this individual will have as a first annual instalment (with general 














 + × 
 (1) 
 
Table 15 – Instalment Calculations 
Scenario 1: Constant Retirement Pension 
First Payment 
  Technical Rate 
Salary 
Growth 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 10.0% 
3.0% 21.55 € 14.31 € 9.49 € 6.29 € 4.17 € 0.80 € 
4.0% 17.57 € 11.81 € 7.93 € 5.32 € 3.56 € 0.72 € 
5.0% 14.18 € 9.65 € 6.56 € 4.45 € 3.02 € 0.63 € 
6.0% 11.34 € 7.81 € 5.37 € 3.69 € 2.53 € 0.56 € 
7.0% 8.99 € 6.26 € 4.35 € 3.03 € 2.10 € 0.48 € 
8.0% 7.08 € 4.98 € 3.50 € 2.46 € 1.73 € 0.41 € 
9.0% 5.53 € 3.93 € 2.79 € 1.98 € 1.41 € 0.35 € 
10.0% 4.30 € 3.08 € 2.21 € 1.58 € 1.14 € 0.30 € 
 
Scenario 2: Pension with 3.5% Growth Per Annum 
First Payment 
  Technical Rate 
Salary 
Growth 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 10.0% 
3.0% 48.59 € 31.40 € 20.28 € 13.09 € 8.45 € 1.48 € 
4.0% 39.61 € 25.92 € 16.95 € 11.07 € 7.23 € 1.32 € 
5.0% 31.97 € 21.18 € 14.01 € 9.27 € 6.12 € 1.16 € 
6.0% 25.57 € 17.13 € 11.47 € 7.68 € 5.13 € 1.02 € 
7.0% 20.28 € 13.74 € 9.30 € 6.30 € 4.26 € 0.89 € 
8.0% 15.96 € 10.92 € 7.48 € 5.12 € 3.50 € 0.76 € 
9.0% 12.47 € 8.62 € 5.96 € 4.12 € 2.85 € 0.65 € 
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 Hence, taking a technical rate of 3% and a salary growth rate of 5% as references, the 
graph of the annual payments due throughout the 40-year career lifetime is depicted as 
follows: 




B. Accept a reduction in the income that will serve as the retirement pension. 
 
Here, matters are simpler, since the calculations are independent of salary growth. Thus, 
for the two scenarios, we obtain the following:  
 
Table 16 – Pension in 2060 relative to the Pension in 2020 
Scenario 1: Constant retirement pension 
Technical Rate 
2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 10.0% 
87.5% 88.7% 89.8% 90.8% 91.7% 94.2% 
 
Scenario 2: Pension with 3.5% growth per annum 
Technical Rate 
2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 10.0% 
82.1% 83.8% 85.4% 86.8% 88.0% 91.9% 
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3.4. DEVELOP ANNUITY MARKETS 
 
Life annuity products have been sold in the past primarily as retirement accumulation 
vehicles, rather than decumulation products (Brown et al., 2001). This may explain why 
annuity markets in Portugal and in most OECD countries have been relatively 
underdeveloped to date. Nonetheless, the conversion of traditional private defined-
benefit (DB) pension plans into defined-contribution (DC) pension plans and the move 
in many European countries towards funded pension systems has attracted attention in 
annuity markets. Furthermore, the Portuguese state-financed public pensions system 
will inevitably be forced to moderate benefit promises in the future. These 
developments will imply a drop in the fraction of retirees’ pension income that is a 
mandatory annuity and in turn, they suggest that insurance-based and privately-
purchased annuity products will emerge as “natural” substitutes. 
 
The appeal of life annuities is that they offer retirees an opportunity to protect 
themselves against the risk of outliving their assets (or simply the risk of decreasing 
retirement income), by exchanging an initial (or periodical) premium for a lifelong 
stream of guaranteed income. Purchasing life annuities is thus a means by which 
retirees can allocate their private savings in order to enhance retirement security, since 
they provide a steady income stream until the insured party’s death. Fully-developed 
annuity markets offer investors a variety of products taking many different payout 
forms, structured with a wide range of premium payment paths, yielding benefits in 
nominal or real terms, either constant or variable and may include additional guarantees. 
 
In order to develop a liquid and efficient annuity market, a number of issues should be 
addressed. First, high-quality information on mortality tables depicting a particular 
group’s distribution of expected remaining lifetime is required. Projected mortality 
tables should take into consideration the stochastic nature of the remaining lifetime and 
encompass cohort effects. Uncertainty regarding mortality tables can cause insurance 
companies to prices annuities conservatively, exacerbating adverse selection problems 
and lowering the access to the market. Additionally, uncertainty regarding mortality 
data can cause individuals to seriously underestimate their survival prospects, which, in 
turn, can lead them to undervalue the importance of longevity insurance. Dissemination 
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of mortality should, in this sense, be considered a matter of public interest and form part 
of a clear supervision policy. 
 
Second, annuity markets are often affected by strong adverse-selection problems. This 
arises if buyers of annuities prove to be live longer than average, inducing insurance 
companies to devise separate mortality tables for annuitants as opposed to those for the 
general population. Whether adverse selection is quantitatively important may depend 
on whether annuitisation is considered optional or mandatory. In this sense, increasing 
compulsory annuitisation can significantly reduce adverse-selection problems. 
 
Third, fiscal incentives should be created in order to stimulate insurance protection 
against longevity risk. In modern competitive markets, individual financial decisions are 
also driven by people’s perceptions about the appeal of alternative investments, both 
during their working lifetime and after retirement. For instance, some individuals may 
avoid annuitisation on the grounds that they can manage their assets better than 
institutional fund managers. In this scenario, fiscal incentives could undermine saving 
decisions in favour of buying annuity protection. 
 
Fourth, for older people, the risk of having to pay large medical bills or cover special 
health care costs induces them to retain at least a fraction of their assets instead of 
annuitising them. This concern should be acknowledged by the insurance industry by its 
developing new financial products that merge life annuities with liquidity requirements. 
 
Fifth, on the supply side, the potential for growth in annuity markets cannot be fully 
accommodated if insurance companies lack assets with which to back the long-term 
promises represented by annuities. Insurance companies offering annuity products are 
faced with two major risk sources: interest-rate risk and longevity risk. Standard 
immunisation theory suggests that in order to protect themselves from small changes in 
the term structure of interest rates, insurance companies should back their annuity 
portfolios with assets whose respective durations equal those of the annuity liabilities, 
and whose respective convexities are larger than those of the annuity liabilities. This is 
difficult in practice, since long-term bonds are not available in most bond markets.  
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Moreover, if real annuities are to be provided, real long-term bonds will have to be 
issued as well. This means that annuity markets would definitely benefit from the 
issuance of long-term government bonds. Moreover, recent events in Argentina and 
Russia have shown that the quality of assets considered is important, since the 
possibility of default is real. 
 
On the other hand, longevity risk, i.e., the chance that entire cohorts live longer than 
anticipated in projected mortality tables, remains a real concern for insurance companies 
selling annuity products, since substantial changes in mortality patterns could seriously 
challenge their profitability. Insurance companies can, for example, hedge longevity 
risk with offsetting life insurance contracts, reducing (but not eliminating completely) 
the impact of negative mortality scenarios. Some advocate that governments (or private 
companies) should issue cohort “survivor bonds” (or longevity bonds), i.e., bonds 
whose future coupons payments depend on a survivorship index (for example, the 
percentage of the whole population of retirement age - say 65 - on the issue date still 
alive on the future coupon payment dates) (Blake et al., 2002). 
 
Although survivor bonds are good candidates for hedging aggregate mortality risk, they 
do not provide a perfect hedge against the particular characteristics of a company’s pool 
of annuitants. In this sense, there is basis risk between the reference population 
mortality and the mortality experienced by any individual pool of annuitants. Other 
problems related to the issuance of survivor bonds include: i) the ability of dealing with 
a business involving huge amounts of capital, ii) pricing complications related to the 
adoption of a particular (stochastic) representation of mortality uncertainty and the 
estimation of the market price of longevity risk and iii) the importance of attractive 
contract design in order to boost market liquidity for traded securities and reduce credit 
risk.  
 
Once a well organised and liquid market for survivor bonds is in place, a whole new 
avenue is open for the development of survivor-derivative products (for example, 
mortality options based on a certain mortality index, futures contracts based on survival 




Finally, alternative methods of hedging longevity risk include the use of traditional 
reinsurance methods, or through risk-sharing in the capital markets, which are 
particularly attractive for investors because of the low or negative correlation with 
traditional risk factors such as financial market indexes, or through the option of annuity 
securitisation, which would benefit insurance companies by providing them with 






























4. CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
 
Whilst Portugal is no different to many other countries, and not least to our European 
partners, in its people’s reaction to any proposal to amend legislation that might have an 
impact on the definition of our expected retirement benefits, it is equally true that we are 
all increasingly aware of the need to introduce such amendments to the system.  
 
Furthermore, if in the not-too-distant past, we started to work at the age of 16 and ended 
at 65, followed by 5 or 6 years of retirement, we cannot demand today that the State – 
which is us – keeps us at school until the age of 22 and also pay us a retirement pension 
– if possible, with a guarantee of protection from inflation – equal to the last salary at 
age 55, in order to pay the doctor who keeps us alive until we are 85. We are speaking 
about life-cycles which are entirely different in terms of the demand on capital. 
However, we do not believe that it would be very difficult to convey the message that 
the future cannot be like the past in this respect.   
 
Perhaps an approach that is based on the ideas presented in this paper should not 
automatically be discarded, because life expectancy, which appears to be the problem, 
in the sense that there are insufficient financial resources to pay for retirement, may in 
fact also be part of the solution. This could come about by: 
  
 Transforming the increased life expectancy into an economic good and opting to 
pay for the “life excess” throughout the entirety of the occupational lifetime. 
This would call for a financial effort that the simple indicators presented here do 
not seem to suggest is beyond reason; or 
 Accepting the “natural reduction” of the pension benefits; or  
 Prolonging the occupational lifetime and using the “life excess”, or part of it. 
However, with regard to this hypothesis, the world’s most competitive nations 
currently experience some difficulty in absorbing the individuals in the age-
groups nearest to the so-called early-retirement ages. Consequently, such a 
solution would involve having to overcome the strongly-felt desire of the many 
individuals in this category who still wish to take early retirement.  
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The idea that the first of these three hypotheses could serve to advance the development 
of the third pillar is reinforced here.   
 
As is commonly the case, the solution is likely to reside in a combination of measures 
which will be based on a new model of retirement, optimizing the contribution life-time, 
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